The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was implemented and studied with the braid groups as its underlying platform. The length-based attack, introduced by Hughes and Tannenbaum, has been used to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol in this setting. Eick and Kahrobaei suggest to use the polycyclic groups as a possible platform for the AAG protocol. In this paper, we apply several known variants of the length-based attack against the AAG protocol with the polycyclic group as the underlying platform. The experimental results show that, in these groups, the implemented variants of the length-based attack are unsuccessful in the case of polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length. This suggests that the length-based attack is insu cient to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol when implemented over this type of polycyclic groups. This implies that polycyclic groups could be a potential platform for some cryptosystems based on conjugacy search problem, such as non-commutative Di e-Hellman, El Gamal and Cramer-Shoup key-exchange protocols. Moreover, we compare for the rst time the success rates of the di erent variants of the length-based attack. These experiments show that, in these groups, the memory length-based attack introduced by Garber, Kaplan, Teicher, Tsaban and Vishne does better than the other variants proposed thus far in this context.
Introduction
The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key-exchange protocol was introduced in 1999 [1] . Following its introduction, the AAG protocol was extensively studied using di erent groups as its underlying platform. Ko et al. [15] used braid groups. Moreover, Myasnikov and Ushakov [18] studied the security of the AAG protocol with respect to several attacks on any platform groups satisfying some theoretic properties (exponentially generic free basis property).
Hughes and Tannenbaum [11] introduced the length-based attack (LBA) on the AAG protocol with its implementation in braid groups. They emphasized the importance of choosing the correct length function. Later, Garber et al. [6] gave several realizations of this approach, particularly a length function for the braid group and experimental results suggesting that the attack fails for the parameters suggested in existing protocols. However, Garber et al. [5] also suggested an extension of the length-based attack which uses memory which succeeded in cryptanalyzing the AAG protocol. A similar attack was implemented against a system based on the Thompson group [19] . Most recently, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] analyzed the reasons behind the failure of the previous implementations of the LBA, such as the occurrence of commutator-type peaks, and gave an experimental evidence that the LBA can be modi ed to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol with high success rate. However, this work is again done the braid groups as the underlying platform.
Eick and Kahrobaei [3] have suggested a di erent platform for the AAG protocol -the polycyclic group. In polycyclic groups, the word problem can be solved e ciently [7] , but known solutions to the conjugacy problem are much less e cient. Using experimental results, Eick and Kahrobaei showed that while the conjugacy problem can be solved within seconds using polycyclic groups with small Hirsch length, the conjugacy problem in polycyclic groups with high Hirsch length requires a much longer time for its solution.
Taking inspiration from this result, we investigate the success rate of the length-based attack on the AAG protocol, where the underlying platform is the polycyclic groups, especially those with high Hirsch length. Toward this end, we rst construct polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length using a method introduced by Holt et al. [10] . Then, we implement the di erent variants of the LBA presented in [5, 6, 17] . The experimental results that we collect suggest that the LBA is insu cient to cryptanalyze the AAG protocol, when we use the polycyclic groups with high enough Hirsch length as the underlying platform. Consequently, the polycyclic group is the rst underlying platform which the LBA is insu cient for cryptanalyzing the AAG protocol on this platform, whereas the solution for the word problem is quite e cient. A suggestion for concrete parameters appears in the last section.
Moreover, we compare for the rst time on any platform the success rates of the di erent variants of the LBA.
As a wider application, we note that the conjugacy search problem is the basis for various cryptographic protocols besides AAG, such as the non-commutative Di e-Hellman key-exchange [15] , the non-commutative El Gamal key-exchange [12] , the non-abelian Cramer-Shoup key-exchange [2] and the non-commutative digital signatures [13] . The LBA can be applied to all these protocols; therefore, a platform group which experimental results show that the LBA is insu cient for cryptanalyzing the AAG protocol over this platform, such as polycyclic groups, can help instantiate them.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol. In Section 3, we give a short review of polycyclic groups and the construction that we have used. In Section 4, we review the length-based attack, and in Section 5, we present the experiments, their results and corresponding conclusions.
The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol
Following [17] , we present here the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol (for more details, see [1] ). As usual, we use two entities, called Alice and Bob, for presenting the two parties which plan to communicate over an insecure channel.
Let be a group with generators 1 , . . . , . First, Alice chooses her public set = ( 1 , . . . ,
1
), where ∈ , and Bob chooses his public set = ( 1 , . . . , 2 ), where ∈ . They both publish their sets. Alice then chooses her private key = for all ∈ and sends it to Alice. Now, the shared secret key is = −1 −1 . Alice computes this key by
Similarly, Bob can compute
, and then he knows the shared secret key by = −1 .
In order to nd , it is enough for the eavesdropper either to nd ὔ ∈ ⟨ 1 , . . . ,
ὔ (an incompatible su cient condition can be found in [14] ).
Thus, the security of the AAG protocol is based on the assumption that the subgroup-restricted simultaneous conjugacy search problem is hard.
Polycyclic groups
In this section, we give a short review for polycyclic groups and describe the construction of polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length. For more details, see [10] .
. The polycyclic presentation
Recall that is a polycyclic group if it has a polycyclic series, i.e., a subnormal series
with non-trivial cyclic factors. The polycyclic generating sequence of is the -tuple ( 1 , . . . , ), such that = ⟨ , +1 ⟩ for 1 ≤ ≤ . Any polycyclic group has a nite presentation of the form
where , , are words in the generators +1 , . . . , and is the set of indices ∈ {1, . . . , } such that = [ : +1 ] is nite. Here stands for −1 .
It is known by induction that each element of de ned by this presentation can be uniquely written as
where ∈ ℤ for 1 ≤ ≤ , and 0 ≤ < for ∈ . We call = 1 1 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ the normal form of an element in . If every element in the group can be uniquely presented in the normal form, then the polycyclic presentation is called consistent. Note that every polycyclic group has a consistent polycyclic presentation (see [10] ).
The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is the number of indices such that = [ : +1 ] is in nite. This number is invariant of the chosen polycyclic sequence.
. Constructing polycyclic groups using number elds
There are several ways for constructing polycyclic groups. For the purpose of this paper, we construct polycyclic groups by semidirect products of the maximal order and the unit group of a number eld. This construction follows [10] .
Let ( ) ∈ ℤ[ ] be an irreducible polynomial. The polynomial de nes a eld extension over ℚ. The maximal order or the ring of integers of the number eld is the set of algebraic integers in ,
The unit group of is = ∈ | ̸ = 0 and −1 ∈ .
For constructing the polycyclic group by the maximal order and the unit group of a number eld where [ : ℚ] = , we recall two results. First, the maximal order forms a ring whose additive group is isomorphic to ℤ (see [20] ). Second, Dirichlet's unit theorem states that given = + 2 , where and 2 are the numbers of real eld monomorphisms → ℝ and complex eld monomorphisms → ℂ respectively, then the unit group is a nitely-generated abelian group of the form ≅ ℤ + −1 × ℤ for some even (see [20] ). Here, we use the fact that the unit group is a nitely-generated abelian group and hence is also polycyclic.
Let be a group and , it is easy to see that if and / are both polycyclic, then the group is also polycyclic by putting together the polycyclic series of and the series induced by the polycyclic series of / . Since the above results guaranteed that the maximal order is a polycyclic group and the unit group, which is isomorphic to / , is also polycyclic, the group = ⋊ is polycyclic. The action which de nes the semidirect product is a multiplication from the right of on . If , the Hirsch length of a polycyclic group is ℎ( ) = ℎ( ) + ℎ( / ); in our case,
where ℎ( ) is , which is the degree of the generating polynomial . Hence, for constructing a polycyclic group of high Hirsch length, we have to nd an irreducible polynomial of high enough degree, and then the polycyclic group constructed by the above method will have Hirsch length larger than the degree of the polynomial.
. Polycyclic groups as platform groups for the AAG protocol
Polycyclic groups are suitable as platform groups for the AAG protocol for several reasons. First, the word problem can be solved e ciently using the collection algorithm [7] , see also [3] . Second, the conjugacy search problem has no e cient solution in general polycyclic groups. This assessment is due to Eick and Kahrobaei [3] , using the following experiment: Let = ℚ[ ]/( ) be an algebraic number eld for a cyclotomic polynomial , where is a primitive -th root of unity. Let ( ) = ⋊ , where is the maximal order and the unit group of , the order of and ℎ( ( )) the Hirsch length. The average time used for 100 applications of the collection algorithm on random words and the average time used for 100 applications of the conjugacy algorithm on random conjugates is We can see that the collection algorithm works very fast even for polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length, and therefore the word problem has an e cient solution. On the other hand, the solution to the conjugacy problem is not e cient for polycyclic groups having high Hirsch length.
The length-based attack
The length-based attack (LBA) is a probabilistic attack against the conjugacy search problem in general, and against the AAG protocol in particular, with the goal of nding Alice's (or Bob's) private key. It is based on the idea that a conjugation of the correct element should decrease the length of the captured package. Using the notations of Section 2, the captured package is ὔ = ( . If we conjugate ὔ with elements from the group ⟨ 1 , . . . , 1 ⟩ and the length of the resulting tuple has been decreased, then we have found a candidate for the conjugating factor. The process of conjugation is then repeated with the decreased-length tuple until a longer candidate for the conjugating factor is found. The process ends when the conjugated captured package is the same as = ( 1 , . . . , 2 ), which is known. Then, the conjugate can be recovered by reversing the sequence of conjugating factors. For more details on the LBA, see [5, 6, 9, 16, 17] .
. Variants of the LBA
In [5, 6, 17, 19] , several variants of the LBA are presented. Here, we give four variants of the LBA that we implemented against the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform. In all these variants, the following input and output are expected:
• Input: = ( 1 , . . . , • Output: An element ὔ ∈ ⟨ 1 , . . . ,
1
⟩ such that ὔ = ὔ for = 1, . . . , 2 , or FAIL if the algorithm cannot nd such ὔ .
We will use the following notation: if = ( 1 , . . . , ), then its total length | | is ∑ =1 | | (the length of , | |, will be discussed in Section 4.2).
. . LBA with backtracking
The most straight-forward variant of LBA (see Algorithm 1) conjugates ὔ directly with ±1 ∈ { 1 , . . . ,
1
}. This is termed "LBA with backtracking" by Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] .
. . LBA with a dynamic set
Through analysis, Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] concluded that di erent types of peaks make LBA unsuccessful. To overcome this, they suggested a new version of the algorithm, which they termed "LBA with a dynamic set". Here (see Algorithm 2), if a generator causes a length reduction, only the conjugates and products involving are added to the dynamic set. On the other hand, if no generator causes a length reduction, all conjugates and two generators products are added. Their experimental results suggest that this algorithm works especially well in the case of keys composed from long generators, but it is not worse than the naive algorithm in the other cases. The algorithm presented here is a modi ed version of their algorithm, which we implemented to attack the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform.
. . Memory-LBA
Another variant, presented in [5] , is also considered. In this variant (see Algorithm 3), we allocate an array of a xed size . The array holds tuples every round. In every round, all elements of are conjugated, but only the smallest conjugated tuples (with respect to their length) are inserted back into . For the halting condition, we use a prede ned time-out.
. . LBA* (with memory)
We present a di erent variant of memory-LBA which is again based on a xed-size array allocated for the algorithm. Here (see Algorithm 4), holds tuples every round and is sorted by the rst element (with respect to the length of conjugated element) of each tuple. In every round, only the smallest element of is removed and conjugated by all the generators and their inverses. The conjugated tuples are inserted back into depending on whether there is a free place in . If there is no more places in , and the conjugated tuple is smaller than the largest element in , swap them and re-sort . Since is always kept sorted, any operation to nd the "smallest element" costs constant time. As in the previous variant, we use a prede ned time-out as the halting condition. Choose ( , ) ∈ such that | | is minimal. Remove ( , ).
4:
for = 1, . . . , 1 and = ±1 do 5: Compute , = | | − | |.
6:

if
= then output inverse of and stop. 7: if , > 0 then ⊳ length has been decreased 8: Add ( , ) to . Choose ( , ) ∈ such that | | is minimal. Remove ( , ). end for 7: if , ≤ 0 for all then 8: De ne ext = ∪ { −1 , , 2 | , ∈ ±1 , ̸ = }.
9:
else De ne
where is such that = max{ , | = 1, . . . , 1 }. for (| |, , ) ∈ do 4: Remove (| |, , ) from .
5:
Compute for all ∈ {1 . . . 1 } and ∈ {±1}. Save (| |, , ) in ὔ .
8:
end for 9: After nished all conjugations, sort ὔ by the rst element of every tuple.
10:
Copy the smallest elements into and delete the rest of ὔ .
11: end while 12: Otherwise, output FAIL. end if 12: end for 13: end while 14: Otherwise, output FAIL.
⊳ no more elements to conjugate
The name LBA* comes from the general idea of A* search algorithm [8] , which uses a best-rst search (as we are doing here -taking the smallest element of and conjugated it). We should note that a very similar algorithm was independently introduced by Tsaban [21] , and the di erence between the two variants is that our variant starts the search from ὔ , while Tsaban's variant starts the search from both directions: ὔ and ὔ (using the idea of "meet in the middle").
. The length function
In the implementation of the LBA, the choice of the length function is important (see [5, 9] ). In our case, the length of a word is chosen to be the sum of the absolute values of the exponents in its normal form. We choose this function because the experimental results presented below show that it satis es the requirement ℓ( −1 ) ≫ ℓ( ) (as needed for a length function used for LBA).
The rst step of the experiments is the construction of a polycyclic group of a given Hirsch length ℎ( ), following the construction in Sections 3.2 and 5.1. Then, an element of length between 10 and 13 is randomly chosen; we choose elements of this length for consistency with the LBA parameters. Another random element satisfying the same length interval is chosen and is computed, and nally, we compute | | − | |. We performed 100 tests for each group and the average di erence is recorded. As we can see, the average di erence is large; speci cally | | − | | is signi cantly larger than | |, indicating that the condition ℓ( −1 ) ≫ ℓ( ) is indeed satis ed.
Experimental results
Our goal is to apply the LBA on the AAG protocol having the polycyclic group as its underlying platform. To that end, we implemented the four variants of the LBA presented in Section 4 and performed experiments on several polycyclic groups having di erent Hirsch lengths.
. Implementation details
Each polycyclic group is constructed by choosing an irreducible polynomial over ℤ, thus de nes an algebraic eld over ℚ. Let be its maximal order and be its unit group, thus ⋊ is the desired polycyclic group. This construction follows [10] and is a part of the Polycyclic package of GAP (see [4] ).
A random element , for Alice's public set, or , for Bob's public set, is generated by taking either some random generators of the group or their inverses and multiplying them together, while maintaining that the length of the element is between a prede ned minimum and maximum. By this method, we take control over the length of the element.
Alice's private key is generated by taking a xed number of random elements in = ( 1 , . . . ,
1
) and multiplying them together. Here we forgo control over length to preserve interesting cases of conjugations actually decreasing the length of , such as a commutator-type peak. The way for choosing the keys is similar to what has been used in [17] . This way also re ects the characterization of the polycyclic group.
. Results
We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel Core I7 quad-core 2.0 GHz computer with 12 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu Version 12.04 with GAP Version 4.5 and 10 GB of memory allocation. In all these tests, the polycyclic group having Hirsch length ℎ( ) is constructed by the above method using polynomial . The sizes of Alice's and Bob's public sets are both 1 = 2 = 20.
. . The e ect of the Hirsch length
In the rst set of tests, the length of each random element or is in the interval From this table, we can see that with a small Hirsch length, the LBA cryptanalyzes the AAG protocol easily with high success rate. However, as the Hirsch length is increased to 7, the success rate decreases. In polycyclic groups with higher Hirsch lengths, we can see the e ect of the time-out more prominently as the total time did not increase much more, but the success rate is dropped to 5%. Although a success rate of 5% is not negligible, note that we use a very small value for . Based on the current experimental results, we expect that increasing the value of will reduce the success rate to 0%.
. . The e ect of the key length
In the second set of tests, we vary the number of elements that compose Alice's private key. Myasnikov and Ushakov [17] suggested that the LBA with a dynamic set has a high success rate with long generators, i.e. random elements have longer length [ 1 , 2 ]. Therefore, we also vary the length of random elements according to the parameters in [17] .
The following results are obtained by LBA with a dynamic set, with a time-out of 30 minutes: The results of this set of tests indicate that just by increasing the number of generators of Alice's private key from 5 (as in the previous set of tests) to 10, the LBA already fails with polycyclic groups having Hirsch length as small as 10.
. . Comparing the four variants of the LBA
In this paper, we compare the success rates of the four variants of the LBA for the rst time on any platform. For comparing the success rates of the four variants of the LBA, we purposely choose the value of the test parameters to be very small in this set of tests. They are as follows: Algorithm LBA with a dynamic set gives the best success rate but took much longer than Algorithm Memory-LBA which gives a similar success rate in much shorter time. We conclude that with a su cient size of memory, Algorithm Memory-LBA is the best variant of the LBA.
. . Using the four variants of the LBA on our test parameters
In the fourth set of tests, we want to see the e ect of the four di erent variants of the LBA presented in Section 4.1 applied to our test parameters. Therefore, we keep the following parameters for all the algorithms: the length of each random element is in the interval [ 1 , 2 ] = [10, 13], Alice's private key is the product of 10 elements and the length of both public sets are 1 = 2 = 20. There is a time-out of 30 minutes per test and in the case of the two memory variants of the LBA, Algorithm Memory-LBA and Algorithm LBA*, a memory of size = 1000 is used. The same polycyclic group having Hirsch length 14 constructed by the polynomial 9 − 7 3 − 1 is used for all the variants of the LBA. As we can see, Memory-LBA algorithm has the best performance in this set of parameters, but even then, it has only 3% success rate. To further test Memory-LBA algorithm, we run another set of tests where we increase the length of random elements to [ 1 , 2 ] = [20, 23] and increase the number of factors of the private key to = 20. To give it a chance of success, we increase the size of the memory to 40,000. The result is 0% success rate.
. . The e ect of increasing the time-out
Since it is possible that the time-out of 30 minutes for each test is too short, we run another set of tests, where the time-out is 4 hours for each test. Memory-LBA algorithm showed the most promise, so we chose it with the following parameters: the length of random elements is in the interval [ 1 , 2 ] = [20, 23] , the number of factors of the private key is = 20 and the size of the memory is 1000. The polynomial used is 9 − 7 3 − 1 producing a polycyclic group of Hirsch length 14. Due to the long time-out, we performed only 50 tests. We still get 0% success rate. Based on the above experimental results, we conclude that the LBA is insu cient for cryptanalyzing the polycyclic groups of high enough Hirsch lengths. One can suggest the following parameters: ℎ( ) = 16, = 20 and [ 1 , 2 ] = [20, 23] for achieving an AAG protocol based on the polycyclic group, which the known variants of the LBA have 0% success rate for cryptanalyzing this protocol.
. . Additional experimental results concerning LBA with a dynamic set algorithm
Here, we present some additional experimental results for LBA with a dynamic set. The time-out for each test is 1 hour. The polynomials used are and ℎ( ) is the Hirsch length of the corresponding polycyclic group. The sizes of Alice's and Bob's public sets are 1 , 2 respectively. Each random element or has length in [ 1 , 2 ] and Alice's private key is the product of = 5 random elements in Alice's public set. The success rate of a batch of 100 tests is recorded. 
